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Article 4

Third-Party Actions: A Plaintiff's Perspective
Curt N. Rodin*
INTRODUCTION

Paragraph 2-406 of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure permits
a defendant to join a third party who may be liable to him for all
or part of the plaintiffs claim against him. , Although paragraph
2-406 pertains directly to actions that may be initiated by
defendants, third-party practice poses significant ramifications
for the plaintiff in terms of trial strategy and negotiation, since
parties otherwise immune from direct suit by the plaintiff may
nevertheless be drawn into the litigation by a third-party complaint. The approach ultimately adopted by the plaintiff is
dependent, to a significant degree, on the particular theory supporting the cause of action and the likelihood of a third-party
complaint.
This article will discuss third-party practice in the context of
various areas of tort law frequently encountered by Illinois practitioners. First, the article will examine cases where an employer,
immune from a direct suit by his employee under the Workers'
Compensation Act, is impleaded by the employee's defendant as
a third-party defendant, and where an initial tort injury is
aggravated by another's negligence. It will then discuss the

* Partner, Anesi, Ozmon, Lewin & Assoc., Chicago, Illinois; B.A. 1972, University of
Illinois (Champaign); J.D. 1975, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
The author gratefully acknowledges Cynde M. Hirschtick, law clerk to the Hon. Robert
Chapman Buckley, Illinois Appellate Court, First District, for her assistance in the preparation of this article.
1. ILL. REV. SWAT. ch. 110, 2-406 (1981) (formerly ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, 25). Paragraph 2-406(b) provides in pertinent part:
Within the time for filing his or her answer or thereafter by leave of court, a
defendant may by third-party complaint bring in as a defendant a person not a
party to the action who is or may be liable to him or her for all or part of the
plaintiffs claim against him or her. Subsequent pleadings shall be filed as in
the case of a complaint and with like designation and effect. The third-party
defendant may assert any defenses which he or she has to the third-party complaint or which the third-party plaintiff has to the plaintiffs claim and shall
have the same right to file a counterclaim or third-party complaint as any other
defendant.
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obsolescence of equitable apportionment and the erosion of
immunities which traditionally prevented certain direct suits by
plaintiffs. Each of these areas will be considered in light of
Skinner v. Reed-Prentice Division Package Machinery Co. 2 and
Illinois' Contribution Act 3 and their effect on plaintiffs litigation strategy. Also considered is the doctrine of joint and several
liability, its implications for plaintiffs, and its reaffirmance in
Coney v. J.L.G. Industries, Inc.,4 recently decided by the Illinois
Supreme Court.
EMPLOYERS AS THIRD-PARTY DEFENDANTS:
EROSION OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION IMMUNITY

Background
The Illinois Workers' Compensation Act 5 is remedial legisla-

tion designed to provide financial protection for the injured
worker who might otherwise have to shoulder medical costs and
lost wages by himself. 6 Prior to the Act's adoption in 1911, an
injured employee could sue his employer in theory, but the common law defenses of contributory negligence, fellow servant negligence, and the assumption of risk doctrine were available
against him. 7 Consequently, it was difficult in practice for the
injured worker to pursue an action against his employer successfully. The difficulty of proof and court delays often resulted in no
remedy, deprived the injured employee of his livelihood, and engendered antagonisms between employers and employees.8
The Workers' Compensation Act was enacted as a substitute
for the common law rights and liabilities of employers and
employees regarding work-related injuries or death. 9 Section 5 of

2. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
3. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70,
301-305(1981).
4. No. 56306, slip op. (Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983). See infra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
5. ILL REv. SrAT. ch. 48,
138.1-138.30(1981).
6. See Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Pathfinder Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 62 Ill. 2d 556, 343 N.E.2d 913 (1976); Vaught v. Industrial Comm'n,

52 Ill. 2d 158, 287 N.E.2d 701 (1972); Zimmerman v. Industrial Comm'n, 50 111. 2d 346, 278
N.E.2d 784 (1972); McDonald v. Industrial Comm'n, 39 111. 2d 396, 235 N.E.2d 824 (1968).
7. See T. ANGERSTEIN, ILLINOIS WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 14 (1952); Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d 1022,366 N.E.2d 1145 (4th Dist. 1977).
8. Leach v. Lauhoff Grain Co., 51 Ill. App. 3d at 1023, 366 N.E.2d at 1146.
9. Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 180,384 N.E.2d 353, 356(1978).
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the Act provides that workers' compensation is the injured
employee's exclusive remedy against his employer,10 thereby precluding an employee from bringing an action against his employer predicated upon any tort theory.1 In addition to the
exclusivity provision, the Act provides that the liability of the
employer is fixed. The amount of compensation under the Act is
thus limited, and often is not as large as an employee would be
awarded under a common law remedy.'2
In essence, the legislature effected a compromise when it
enacted the Workers' Compensation Act. While the Act limits the
exposure of the employer, it provides that recovery for workrelated injuries is automatic and without regard to the employer's fault.13 Further, contributory negligence, assumption of risk
and other common law defenses are not available under the
Act.' 4 Hence, the conduct of the injured employee is similarly
irrelevant to recovery under the Act.
10. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, 138.5(a) (1981).
11. The exclusivity provision in
138.5(a) also extends to borrowing
employers. If a plaintiff is a "loaned servant," both the borrowing and the lending
employers are immune from liability outside of the Workers' Compensation Act. See
Johnson Paving Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 82 Ill. 2d 341, 412 N.E.2d 477 (1980); Kristensen v. Gerhardt F. Meyne Co., 104 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 433 N.E.2d 1050 (1st Dist. 1982);
Freeman v. Augustine's, Inc., 46 Ill. App. 3d 230, 360 N.E.2d 1245 (5th Dist. 1977). See
also Wiedner, The Workmen's CompensationAct, 1967 U. ILL LF. 21.
Illinois courts, however, have carved out exceptions to immunity under the Act. See
Laffoon v. Bell & Zoller Coal Co., 65 Ill. 2d 437, 359 N.E.2d 125 (1977) (no immunity for
contractor required to pay workers' compensation to employee of uninsured subcontractor); Smith v. Metropolitan Sanitary Dist., 77 Ill. 2d 313, 396 N.E.2d 524 (1979) (employer's immunity under workers' compensation does not extend to liability of employer in a
second capacity other than employer); Note, Dual CapacityDoctrine in Illinois, 12 Loy.
U. CHI. L.J. 705 (1981). See also Sharp v. Gallagher, 95 Ill. 2d 322, 447 N.E.2d 786 (1983)
(dual capacity case requiring a "separate legal persona" in order for employer to be liable
in tort); and Toth v. Westinghouse Elevator Co., No. 82-1678, slip op. (Ill. App. Ct. May 24,
1983) (holding an employer immune from workers' compensation claims absent a dual
persona identity).
12. For example, ILL REv. STAT. ch. 48, 138.8(b) provides that an employee temporarily disabled is entitled to receive two-thirds of his lost weekly wage. Damages awarded in
a successful negligence action may often equal several years worth of the employee's
salary.
13. The liability of an employer under the Workers' Compensation Act is not a tort
liability, but is an obligation imposed as an incident of the employment relationship, the
cost of which is to be borne by the business enterprise. Arnold v. Industrial Comm'n, 21
Ill. 2d 57, 171 N.E.2d 26 (1961). See also Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d
353 (1978); Bryntesen v. Carroll Constr. Co., 27 111. 2d 566, 190 N.E.2d 315 (1963); Freeman
v. Augustine's, Inc., 46 Ill. App. 3d 230, 360 N.E.2d 1245 (5th Dist. 1977).
14. See Ansell v. Industrial Comm'n, 85 Ill. 2d 69, 421 N.E. 2d 179 (1981) (contributory
negligence); Scheffler Greenhouses, Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n, 66 Ill. 2d 361, 362 N.E.2d
325 (1977) (assumption of risk). Moreover, it is well established that an employee is
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The exclusivity provision, however, may prove to be quite disadvantageous for the injured worker. For example, an employer
may remove certain safety guards from a machine, making the
machine unreasonably dangerous in light of its intended use.
The employer may further fail to provide any warnings regarding the unreasonably dangerous nature of the machine. An
employee injured while using the machine is, nevertheless, barred
under section 5 from bringing an action against the employer
premised on strict liability in tort and must rely on a claim for
workers' compensation, which will likely result in an award significantly less than the verdict in a products liability case on the
15
same facts.
Although the employee in the foregoing example is prevented
from suing his employer directly in tort, he is permitted to file an
action against negligent third parties, such as the manufacturer
of the defective product, 16 even though he was compensated
under the Act. 17 By proceeding against the third party, the
employee is thus able to obtain full compensation, notwithstanding the Act's limitation on recovery, and to involve indirectly in
the same suit the employer, who may be liable as a third-party
defendant under the Contribution Act and certain common law
remedies.1 8 This practice occurs most often in products liability

entitled to workers' compensation if he is injured within the scope of his employment,
even though he may have violated a company rule. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co. v.
Industrial Comm'n, 38 111. 2d 441, 232 N.E.2d 293 (1967).
15. For limitations on workers' compensation recovery, see ILL REV. SWAT. ch. 48,
138.8 (1981).
16. See McGill v. Illinois Power Co., 18 Ill. 2d 242, 163 N.E. 2d 454 (1960) (employee
sued owner of improperly insulated power line on which he fell while working for
employer); O'Brien v. Chicago City Ry., 305 Ill. 244, 137 N.E. 214 (1923) (city employee
sued owner of street car which injured him while working); Miller v. Yellow Cab Co., 308
Ill. App. 217, 31 N.E.2d 406 (1st Dist. 1941) (employee sued cab company for injuries while
riding in cab in the course of employment). For further discussion on this topic, see Weisgall, Product Liability in the Workplace: The Effect of Workers' Compensation on the
Rights and Liabilities of Third Parties,1977 Wis. L REv. 1035; Weidner, The Workmen's
CompensationAct, 1967 U. ILL L.F. 21; Comment, Development of Rights againstNegligent Third Parties under Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, 9 DE PAUL L. REv. 220
(1960).
17. See Meade v. Boggiano, 127 111. App. 2d 344, 262 N.E.2d 310 (1st Dist. 1970). Additionally, the employer has a workers' compensation lien right against any monies paid
by the third-party tortfeasor as a result of the injury or death of the employee. ILL REV.
SWAT. ch. 48, 138.5(b) (1981). This provision of the Act is intended to prevent a double
recovery by an injured employee or his personal representative. See Hartford Acc. &
Indem. Co. v. D.F. Bast, Inc., 56 Ill. App. 3d 960, 372 N.E.2d 829 (1st Dist. 1977).
18. See infra notes 19-55 and accompanying text.
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litigation and in suits under the Structural Work Act.19
ProductsLiability
The doctrine of products liability in Illinois embodies a policy
of placing the risk of loss from defective products upon manufacturers and other parties who create the risk and thereafter reap
the profit. 20 In 1974, in Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc.,2 1 the Illinois
Supreme Court prevented a manufacturer from shifting the risk
of loss to an employer who allegedly misused the product. In
Burke, an employee of a housing authority was fatally injured
when a cable on the scaffold he was using broke. The employee's
widow brought a strict liability action against the manufacturer
of the scaffold. The manufacturer, in turn, filed a third-party
complaint against the housing authority for implied indemnity,
alleging that the housing authority had misused the scaffold by
failing to follow the manufacturer's maintenance and operational instructions. 22 The supreme court affirmed the trial court's
dismissal of the third-party complaint. The court reasoned that
the third-party complaint presented a defense to the widow's
claim, and thus no indemnity action against the housing authority would be necessary if the evidence sustained the manufactur23
er's claim.
Three years later, the supreme court overruled its holding in
Burke. The court upheld third-party complaints brought against
employers in products liability actions in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division Package Machinery Co. 24 and two companion cases,
Stevens v. Silver ManufacturingCo. 25 and Robinson v. International Harvester Co. 26 In Skinner, an employee was injured

60-69 (1981). See infra notes 43-53 and accompanying text.
19. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 48,
20. See Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965).
21. 57 Ill. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974).
22. Id. at 543, 316 N.E.2d at 517.
23. Id. at 546, 316 N.E.2d at 519.
24. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
25. 70 Ill. 2d 41,374 N.E.2d 455 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 41 (1978).
26. 70 Ill. 2d 47, 374 N.E.2d 458 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 47 (1978). For a discussion
on the Skinner, Stevens, and Robinson cases, see Appel & Michael, Contribution Among
Joint Tortfeasorsin Illinois: An Opportunityfor Legislative and Judicial Cooperation, 10
Loy. U. CI. LJ. 169 (1979); Comment, Comparative Contribution:Legislative Enactment
of the Skinner Doctrine, 14 J. MAR. L. REV. 173 (1980); Note, Skinner v. Reed-Prentice
Division PackageMachinery Co.: Adoption of Contribution in Illinois, 9 LoY. U. CHI. L.J.
1015 (1978).
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while working on an injection molding machine. The employee
brought an action in strict liability against the manufacturer of
the machine, Reed-Prentice.2 7 A third-party complaint, charging
negligence and seeking contribution, was filed by Reed-Prentice
against the employer. The employer's motion to dismiss the
third-party complaint was granted by the trial court and affirmed
by the appellate court.28 The supreme court, however, reversed
the lower courts and held that the third-party complaint stated a
cause of action for contribution against the employer. The court
stated: "We hold that the third party complaint, although charging negligence, alleges misuse of the product and assumption of
risk and states a cause of action based on the employer's relative
'29
degree of fault which contributed to cause plaintiff's injuries.
Thus, following Skinner, the employer was no longer immune
30
from tort liability.
The effect of Skinner on an employer's third-party liability
was addressed recently in Doyle v. Rhodes.3 1 In Doyle, a highway flagman brought an action for personal injuries he received
when struck by the defendant's car. The defendant filed a thirdparty complaint against the road contractor, the flagman's
employer, seeking contribution. The trial court dismissed the
third-party complaint on the ground that it was barred by the
exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. 32 The
appellate court in Doyle reversed the lower court and held that
the original defendant was entitled to contribution from the
employer. 33 Moreover, the court interpreted Skinner as subjecting the employer to unlimited contribution by the original defendant.3 4 In permitting unlimited contribution, the appellate court
found it significant that the majority opinion in Skinner did not

27. 70111. 2d at 4, 5, 374 N.E.2d at 438.
28. 40 Ill.
App. 3d 99, 351 N.E.2d 405 (lst Dist. 1976).
29. 70 Ill.
2d at 16, 374 N.E.2d at 444. Following Skinner, the Illinois legislature
enacted a statute entitled "Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors," ILL REv. STAT. ch 70,
301-305 (1981), which applies to causes of action arising on or after March 1, 1978. This

legislation codifies the supreme court's elimination of the no-contribution rule in Illinois.
30. See ILL REV. STAT. ch. 70,
301-305 (1981).
31. 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 440 N.E.2d 895 (1982), case under advisement, No. 57540 (111.
Sup. Ct. May Term 1983).
32. 109 Ill.
App. 3d at 591, 440 N.E.2d at 896. The trial court held that the Contribution Act was not broad enough to encompass an action by the defendant against the
plaintiffs employer since the employer was not "subject to liability in tort" as the Act
requires.
33. Id. at 594, 440 N.E.2d at 898.
34. Id.
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refer to the policy of limited liability embodied under the Workers'
Compensation Act, even though the employer and employee in
that case were covered under the Act. 35 The Doyle court further
noted that the dissenters in Skinner "read the majority opinion
as putting no limits on contribution, but simply basing contribu36
tion on relative causation of the injuries."
Skinner and its progeny have obvious beneficial implications
for the plaintiff-employee. First, the Skinner holding will likely
result in a safer work place. Prior to Skinner, an employer was
immune to an action based on strict liability in tort, 37 even
though it was responsible for the unsafe modifications of a product. With liability limited to that imposed under the Workers'
Compensation Act and the federal Occupational Safety and
Health Act, 38 the amount of damages and/or penalties an
employer might incur was minimal compared with the potential
verdict recoverable in a products liability case. After Skinner,
however, an employer can be held fully liable for its actions as a
result of a third-party claim for contribution by the manufacturerdefendant, thereby increasing the incentive for an employer to
create a safer working environment.
Skinner has produced additional ramifications for the plaintiff
with regard to trial strategy. Previously, in a products liability
suit, if a manufacturer could show that certain conduct of the
employer amounted to an intervening act and the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries, the manufacturer could avoid
liability.39 Examples of such intervening conduct by the employer
include modifying the product so as to make it unreasonably
dangerous or failing to provide adequate warnings concerning

35. Id. at 593, 440 N.E.2d at 897.
36. Id.
37. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, 138.5(a) (1981).
38. 29 U.S.C. §§ 651-678 (1976).
39. See Gasdiel v. Federal Press Co., 78 Ill. App. 3d 222, 396 N.E.2d 1241 (1st Dist.
1979). In Gasdiel, the court held that the substitution by plaintiffs employer of a significantly different starting mechanism on a punch press manufactured and distributed by
the defendants was a substantial change in the condition of the press. As such, it operated, absent a causal connection between the lack of additional point of operation safety
guards in the original design of punch press and plaintiffs injury, to relieve defendants

of liability. See also Rios v. Niagra Mach. & Tool Works, 59 Ill. 2d 79, 319 N.E.2d 232
(1974); Coleman v. Verson Allsteel Press Co., 64 fll. App. 3d 974, 382 N.E.2d 36 (1978). For
further discussion, see Goldich, Supervening Cause and Manufacturers' Nondelegable
Duty, 1976 U. ILL LF. 396.
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the unreasonably dangerous nature of the product.4 0 Similarly,
prior to Skinner, employers were not liable for such intervening
acts. 4 1 Thus, there was no incentive for an employer to try and
establish the defective nature of the product as the proximate
cause of the injury. Now that the employer can be named as a
third-party defendant, many employers may be more willing to
assist the plaintiff in proving his case against the manufacturer.
The employer will try to show that the defective design or manufacture of the product was the proximate cause of the plaintiffs
injuries, rather than the modifications made by the employer.
Finally, in certain cases involving minor modifications unrelated
to proximate cause, the employer may more readily waive his
42
workers' compensation lien.
Structural Work Act
The Structural Work Act of Illinois 43 was enacted in 1907 with
the avowed purpose of providing protection and safety for those
persons engaged in and exposed to the historically recognized
dangers of construction. 44 In the hierarchical scheme within the
construction industry, the worker possesses the least authority to
specify his working conditions, and is least able, financially, to
bargain for those conditions that would enhance his safety.45 As
a result, it is the worker who is the usual victim of deviations
40. See Burke v. Sky Climber, Inc., 57 111. 2d 542, 316 N.E.2d 516 (1974).
41. ILL REV. SrAT. ch. 48, 138.5(a) (1981).
42. See supra note 17.
60-69 (1981).
43. ILL REV. SWAT. ch. 48,
44. The purpose of the Structural Work Act is indicated in the formal title to the Act
which states it is an "Act providing for the protection and safety of persons in and about
the construction, repair, alteration or removal of buildings." The scope of protection
afforded workers under the Act is set forth in 60, which provides in pertinent part:
All scaffolds, hoists, cranes, stays, ladders, supports, or other mechanical contrivances, erected or constructed by any person, firm or corporation in this State
for the use in the erection, repairing, alteration, removal or painting of any
house, building, bridge, viaduct, or other structure, shall be erected and constructed, in a safe, suitable and proper manner, and shall be so erected and
constructed, placed, and operated as to give proper and adequate protection to
the life and limb of any person or persons employed or engaged thereon, or
passing under or by the same, and in such manner as to prevent the falling of
any material that may be used or deposited thereon.
45. See N. OZMON, Overview of State and Caselaw, in ILLINOIS STRUCTURAL WORK AcT
PRACTICE 9 (1979). The author notes that the working man usually finds himself with two
alternatives: he may accept conditions as he finds them or, impractically or unfeasibly,
he may leave his employment and his wages behind after voicing his criticism of working conditions. Additionally, the working man, although an expert within his particular
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from accepted safety practices. Cognizant of this situation, courts
have given the Structural Work Act a liberal interpretation in
order to effectuate its beneficial purposes.4 6 Inasmuch as the
broadest protection possible for workers is desired, contributory
negligence and assumption of risk are not defenses under the

Act.

47

Liability under the Act extends to any owner, contractor,
48
foreman or other person "having charge" of the work performed.
49
The supreme court in Larson v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
emphasized that the term "having charge" carries with it a
broad meaning which cannot be reduced to "supervision and
control." Larson effectively created two classes of potential
defendants under the Act: those who have charge of a particular
phase of the work and usually exercise immediate supervision

work phase of construction, usually lacks the broad exposure, overall knowledge, or time
frame to view the hazards and preventatives of injury relating to his and other workers'
safety.
46. Halberstadt v. Harris Trust & Say. Bank, 55 Ill. 2d 121, 302 N.E.2d 64 (1973); Lyle
v. Sester, 103 Ill. App. 3d 208, 430 N.E.2d 699 (2d Dist. 1981); Urman v. Walter, 101 Ill.
App. 3d 1085, 428 N.E.2d 1051 (1st Dist. 1981); Burke v. Illinois Power Co., 57 Ill. App. 3d
498, 373 N.E.2d 1354 (1st Dist. 1978); McNellis v. Combustion Eng'g, Inc., 13 Ill. App. 3d
733, 301 N.E.2d 96 (1st Dist. 1973).
47. See Juliano v. Oravec, 53 Ill. 2d 566, 570, 293 N.E.2d 897, 899 (1973). In Schultz v.
Henry Ericsson Co., 264 Ill. 156, 106 N.E. 236 (1914), the Illinois Supreme Court described
the Act's purpose as follows:
The object to be attained by this statute was to prevent injuries to persons
employed in this dangerous and extra hazardous occupation, so that negligence
on their part in the manner of doing their work might not prove fatal .... The
language of the statute is mandatory and imperative that the scaffold shall be
so constructed as to be safe and afford adequate protection to the persons working
thereon, and the [defendant] cannot escape liability for a willful violation of the
statute where he constructs an insufficient, unsafe, and dangerous scaffold ....
264 Ill. at 164-65, 106 N.E. at 239-40 (emphasis supplied). The supreme court, on several
occasions following Schultz, has considered this issue and has consistently reaffirmed
that contributory negligence and assumption of risk are not defenses in a Structural
Work Act suit. See Bryntesen v. Carrol Constr. Co., 27 Ill. 2d 566, 190 N.E.2d 315 (1963);
Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. Ry., 22 Ill. 2d 305,175 N.E.2d 785 (1961);
Kennerly v. Shell Oil Co., 13 Ill. 2d 431, 150 N.E.2d 134 (1958).
48. ILL REv. SWAT. ch. 48, 69 (1981). In Gannon v. Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &
Pac. Ry., 22 Ill. 2d 305, 175 N.E.2d 785 (1961), it was established that a defendant, even if
it is one of the entities specified in 69, must also "have charge" of the work. Much of the
litigation in Structural Work Act cases involves the meaning of the "having charge"
requirement. See, e.g., Przybylski v. Perkins & Will Architects, Inc., 95 Ill. App. 3d 620,
420 N.E.2d 524 (1st Dist. 1981); Bishop v. Crowther, 92 Ill. App. 3d 1, 415 N.E.2d 599 (1st
Dist. 1980); Kjellesvik v. Commonwealth Edison Co., 73 Ill. App. 3d 773, 392 N.E.2d 116
(1st Dist. 1979); Long v. Duggan-Karasik Constr. Co., 23 Ill. App. 3d 812, 320 N.E.2d 553
(1st Dist. 1974).
49. 3311. 2d 316, 211 N.E.2d 247 (1965).
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and control, and those who are in the upper levels of the con50
struction hierarchy with overall responsibility for the work.
In many instances, the plaintiffs employer exercises direct
control over and is one of the entities having charge of the work.
The injured worker, however, is precluded by the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act 5' from bringing a

Structural Work Act suit against his employer. The only remedy
traditionally available to the worker against his employer would
be a claim for workers' compensation. This is true even though
the employer may be best able to alleviate the dangerous condition on the jobsite that gives rise to the accident.
Third-party practice prevents an employer from escaping liability for injuries under the Structural Work Act. For example, in
certain situations, the owner of the premises where the work was
52
performed may qualify as a party "having charge" of the work.
The injured worker can thus bring a Structural Work Act suit
against the owner, wh-i may then bring a third-party action
against the employer of the injured worker sounding in either
indemnity or contribution. Because the Workers' Compensation
Act does not preclude an indemnity action, 53 a passively delinquent party, if held accountable, may transfer all its statutory
liability to the actively delinquent party. 54 Assuming the cause
of action arose on or after March 1, 1978, pursuant to both

50. The expansive interpretation of the "having charge" requirement set forth in the
Larson case was more recently reaffirmed by the supreme court in Norton v. Wilbur
Waggoner Equip. Rental & Excavating Co., 76 Ill. 2d 481, 394 N.E.2d 403 (1979).
51. ILL REV. STAT. ch. 48, 138.5(a) (1981).
52. See Banwart v. Okesson, 83 Ill. App. 3d 222, 403 N.E.2d 1234 (2d Dist. 1980). In
that case, the defendant owner had charge of the work where he provided the scaffolding,
assisted in assembling it, instructed workers where to place it and attempted to provide
additional instructions to the workers. But cf. Derrico v. Clark Equip. Co., 91 Ill. App. 3d
4, 413 N.E.2d 1345 (1st Dist. 1980), where the mere fact that the owner of the showroom
where a window washer was injured had signed a job ticket was not sufficient to show
the owner was "in charge" of work being done by the window washer.
53. See Miller v. De Witt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226 N.E.2d 630 (1967); Przybylski v. Perkins &
Will Architects, Inc., 95 Ill. App. 3d 620, 420 N.E.2d 524 (1st Dist. 1981); Malauskas v.
Tishman Constr. Corp., 81 Ill. App. 3d 759, 401 N.E.2d 1013 (1st Dist. 1980); Isabelli v.
Cowels Chem. Co., 7 Ill. App. 3d 888, 289 N.E.2d 12 (lst Dist. 1972).
54. An indemnity action is possible because varying degrees of fault are recognized
under the Structural Work Act. See McInerney v. Hasbrook Constr. Co., 62 Ill. 2d 93, 338
N.E.2d 868 (1975); Malauskas v. Tishman Constr. Corp., 81 Ill. App. 3d 759, 401 N.E.2d
1013 (1st Dist. 1980); Mosley v. Northwestern Steel & Wire Co., 76 Ill. App. 3d 710, 394
N.E.2d 1230 (1st Dist. 1979). In Malauskas, the court held that a third-party complaint,
alleging the employer supplied plaintiff with a ladder it should have known was unsafe
and ordered plaintiff to work in unsafe areas, stated a cause of action against the
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Skinner and the Illinois' Contribution Act,55 the principal defen-

dant can also minimize its share of the damages by seeking contribution from the employer of the injured worker. 56
Implications of Contributionfor Plaintiff-Employees
The Contribution Act has no direct legal effect on the plaintiffemployee. Rather, under contribution, the fault of the individual
defendants is compared in an effort to apportion their liability
for damages owed to the plaintiff. The Contribution Act specifically provides that it does not affect the right of the plaintiff to
collect the total amount of his judgment from any defendant subject to liability.57 From a pragmatic viewpoint, however, the Act
produces significant ramifications for the plaintiff during settlement negotiation and trial where the employer is a third-party
defendant.
During the negotiation stage, for instance, the possibility of
contribution permits the plaintiffs attorney to appraise more
realistically the parameters of liability and the responsibility of
the individual defendants. When indemnity alone was available,
an "all or nothing" type of resolution was presented. Accordingly, the primary defendant sought to shift the blame completely onto the employer of the plaintiff, with the result that
little or no settlement offers were made during negotiations. With
contribution, the defendant will more likely concede some liability, and settle for a percentage of the potential verdict. Incentive
for such conduct derives from the Contribution Act itself, which
provides that a potentially liable party who settles in good

faith58 is discharged from all liability 59 for contribution to any

employer for indemnity. See also Bua, Third Party Practice in Illinois: Express and
Implied Indemnity, 25 DE PAUL L. REv. 287 (1976).
55. 70 Ill.2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978); ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 70, 301 (1981).
56. Following the enactment of the Contribution Act, the viability of the activepassive theory of indemnity was questioned. For a discussion of the impact of the Contribution Act on the implied indemnity doctrine, see Van Jacobs v. Parikh, 97 Ill. App. 3d
610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1st Dist. 1981). See also Ferrini, The Evolution from Indemnity to
Contribution-A Question of the Future, if any, of Indemnity, 59 CHI B. REc. 254 (1978);
Widland, Contribution:The End to Active-Passive Indemnity, 69 ILL B.J. 78 (1980).
57. ILL REv. STAT. ch. 70, 304 (1981).
58. The term "good faith" is not defined in the Act. See Widland, supra note 56, at 78.
59. ILL REv. SAT. ch. 70, 302(d) (1981).
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other tortfeasor, even if the party settles before a judgment is
60
entered.
The effects of the Contribution Act may also impinge on the
plaintiff's case at trial, because of its tendency to increase the
number of cross-claims filed by defendants. In the process of trying to prove their claims against each other, the defendants may
help the plaintiff prove certain elements of his case. Additionally, the cross-claims help shift the jury's attention away from
"plaintiff versus defendant" to "defendant versus defendant." As
a result of this shift in focus, the jury may be more amenable to
awarding a verdict for the plaintiff.
Conversely, the Contribution Act may work to the plaintiffs
disadvantage in third-party actions brought by the primary
defendant against the employer of the injured worker. In seeking
contribution from the employer, the defendant will argue that
the employer was guilty of wrongful acts which contributed to
cause the plaintiff s injury. In making this argument, the defendant will attempt to prove misconduct on the part of the
employees of the employer, including the plaintiff. The implication to the jury is that the plaintiff was in some way negligent.
The foregoing problem, of course, is not a new one. It existed
under indemnity, prior to the adoption of contribution. 6 1 The
Contribution Act, however, compounds the problem. Under
indemnity, a defendant was required to prove that the wrongful
acts of the plaintiffs employer were the major cause of the
injury. 62 This burden was difficult for many defendants because
their fault often equaled that of the employer.6 3 Thus, very few
defendants were able to bring successful third-party actions
against the employer. Now, under contribution, the defendant
64
need only show some wrongdoing on the part of the employer.
With this lesser burden, an increased number of third-party
actions may be brought against employers with a concomitant
increase in attempts to prove the plaintiff-employee's own negligence. The plaintiff can alleviate this problem to some degree
with a motion in limine to exclude any mention of the plaintiffs

60. Id. 302(a).
61. See, e.g., Burke v. Skyclimber, 57 111. 2d 542,545, 316 N.E.2d 516, 517-18 (1974).
62. See Kosovrasti v. Kux Mach. Co., 58 Ill. App. 3d 892, 375 N.E.2d 832 (lst Dist.
1978); Templeton v. Blaw-Knox Co., 49 Ill. App. 3d 1057, 365 N.E.2d 235 (3d Dist. 1977).
63. See cases cited supra note 62.
64. See Skinner, 70l. 2d at 15, 374 N.E.2d at 443.
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conduct and to limit evidence of wrongful acts to those of the
employer.
Although the Contribution Act has no direct legal effect on the
plaintiff, its practical applications will continue to be a major
concern in the planning and strategy of the plaintiffs case. Of
equal concern in gauging the amount of plaintiffs recovery is
the Act's effect on joint and several liability as it now exists in
Illinois.
Joint and Several Liability
The Contribution Act expressly retains the common law doctrine of joint and several liability,6 5 which posits that each joint
tortfeasor can be held liable for the entire amount of damages
due the injured worker.66 Under joint and several liability in
Illinois, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the full amount of his
judgment, including the amount of damages resulting from the
conduct of parties not named as defendants in the original suit,
against any one of the defendants held liable. 67 The fault of the
unnamed or absent parties is not compared and does not reduce
the plaintiffs verdict.68
To illustrate, assume that in a Structural Work Act suit the
plaintiffs employer is thirty percent at fault. The employer, however, is immune from direct liability to the plaintiff as a result of
the workers' compensation exlusivity provision. 69 If the plaintiff
brings suit against the general contractor and the owner of the
premises, each will be jointly and severally liable for the full

65. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 70, 304 (1981) states as follows: "A plaintiffs right to recover
the full amount of his judgment from any one or more defendants subject to liability in
tort for the same injury to person or property, or for wrongful death, is not affected by the
provisions of this Act." The doctrine of joint and several liability has been entrenched in
Illinois for about a century, since Wabash, St. Louis & Pac. Ry. v. Shacklet Adm'x, 105
Ill. 364 (1883). The doctrine was more recently reaffirmed by the supreme court in Buehler
v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 374 N.E.2d 460 (1977), modified, 70 Ill.2d 51 (1978). Most recently,
the Illinois Supreme Court in the case of Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., No. 56306, slip op.
(Ill. Sup. Ct. May 18, 1983) upheld the doctrine once again.
66. The term "joint tortfeasors" refers to those wrongdoers whose independent, concurrent acts have contributed to cause plaintiffs single, indivisible injury. See W.
PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS

67.

§§

47-50 (4th ed. 1971).

See Carver v. Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 305 N.E.2d 161 (1973); Reese v. Burlington

& Quincy R.R., 55 111. 2d 356, 303 N.E.2d 382 (1973); Miller v. DeWitt, 37 Ill. 2d 273, 226
N.E.2d 630 (1967).
68.
69.
text.

See supra note 67.
ILL REv. STAT. ch. 48,

138.5(a) (1981). See supra notes 10-16 and accompanying
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amount of the verdict. The percentage of fault attributable to the
employer, the absent party, is not subtracted from the total
amount of damages awarded the plaintiff. Hence, under joint
and several liability in Illinois, the burden of the absent party's
liability devolves upon the defendants, rather than the plaintiff.
Although the defendants can seek contribution from the employer
to recoup the amount of damages attributed to the latter, it is the
defendants, not the plaintiff, who must prove fault on the part of
the employer. 70 The plaintiff need only prove his case against
the primary defendants.
The case of Coney v. J.L.G. Industries,Inc.,71 recently decided
by the Illinois Supreme Court, reaffirmed the doctrine of joint
and several liability under the Contribution Act, 72 thereby pro-

tecting Illinois plaintiffs from potential harm. The following
comparison with Wisconsin, where the fault of the employer and
other absent parties is compared and diminishes the plaintiffs
verdict, 73 illustrates the ill effect that abandoning joint and several liability would produce.
Assume, for example, that in a particular case the plaintiff
was ten percent at fault, the plaintiffs absent employer was
sixty percent at fault, and the general contractor was thirty percent at fault. Under joint and several liability in Illinois presently, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover 100 percent of his
verdict from the general contractor. Neither the fault of the
employer nor the injured plaintiff would be compared to reduce

70. In the foregoing example, it is advantageous for the primary defendant to prove
that the employer was 30 percent at fault in order to reduce its own liability to the
plaintiff.
71. No. 56306, slip op. (1l. Sup. Ct. May 18,1983).
72. In Coney, the plaintiff filed suit against the manufacturer of a hydraulic manlift.
The complaint alleged that the decedent died as a result of the unreasonably dangerous
condition of the machinery. As an affirmative defense, the defendant claimed that the
negligence of plaintiffs decedent and the employer was the proximate cause of the injuries. The trial court accepted plaintiffs argument that comparative negligence did not
abrogate the doctrine of joint and several liability and refused to reduce the plaintiffs
judgment by the amount of negligence attributable to the decedent and his employer. The
Illinois Supreme Court held that "comparative fault" would be applied in products liability cases and that misuse of the product or assumption of risk will no longer bar recovery,
but will become part of the plaintiffs comparative fault. Id.
73. See Johnson v. Heintz, 73 Wis. 2d 286, 243 N.W.2d 815 (1976); Pierringer v. Hoger,
21 Wis. 2d 182, 124 N.W.2d 106 (1963). In Pierringer,the plaintiff settled with all but one
of the defendants. Although the settling defendants were dismissed from the plaintiffs
lawsuit, the jury was still required to calculate the negligence attributable to each. The
supreme court held that the non-settling defendant was liable only for his proportionate
negligence.
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the judgment.7 4 In Wisconsin, however, the same plaintiff would
only be entitled to collect thirty percent of his verdict from the
general contractor. 75 He would be deprived of the remaining
76
seventy percent of his judgment.
The result reached under the Wisconsin rule is inconsistent
with the philosophy underlying the Illinois Structural Work Act,
which attempts to spread the risk of loss and responsibility for

74. The contributory negligence or assumption of risk of the plaintiff has never been a
defense under the Structural Work Act of Illinois. See Bryntesen v. Carroll Constr. Co., 27
Ill. 2d 566, 190 N.E.2d 315 (1963). The doctrine of comparative negligence, as adopted by
the Illinois Supreme Court in the landmark case of Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Ill. 2d 1, 421 N.E.2d
886 (1981), does not apply to causes of action under the Structural Work Act. The court in
Alvis made clear that comparative negligence was to apply only in cases where the contributory negligence of the plaintiff had been a bar to recovery. The court stated:
We cannot continue to ignore the plight of plaintiffs who, because of some negligence on their part, are forced to bear the entire burden of their injuries.
Neither can we condone the policy of allowing defendants to totally escape liability for injuries arising from their own negligence on the pretext that another
party's negligence has contributed to such injuries. We therefore hold that in
cases involving negligence the common law doctrine of contributory negligence
is no longer the law in the State of Illinois, and in those instances where applicable it is replacedby the doctrine of comparative negligence.
85 Ill. 2d at 24-25, 421 N.E.2d at 896-97 (emphasis supplied).
75. Wisconsin has not enacted legislation similar in nature, purpose or effect to Illinois' Structural Work Act. It has enacted a safe-place statute, however, which provides
that "[elvery employer shall furnish employment which shall be safe for the employes
therein and shall furnish a place of employment which shall be safe for employes therein
and for frequenters thereof and shall furnish and use safety devices and safeguards ...
WIs. STAT. § 101.11 (1981).
The Wisconsin workers' compensation statute is similar to Illinois' in that it contains
an exclusivity provision which in effect prevents direct suits by employees against their
employers. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 102.03(2) (West 1982-1983).
76. The Wisconsin rule was criticized in an amicus curiae brief filed by the Illinois Trial
Lawyers Association in the Coney case. In their brief, the trial lawyers explained how the
Wisconsin system poses problems for settlement potential:
This procedure is such a gamble for a plaintiff desirous of settlement that it is
regarded as ill-advised for the plaintiff in the majority of circumstances and
thus is a positive barrier to settlement. In fact, it leaves the plaintiffs attorney
wide open to a malpractice claim unless the client understands perfectly what is
being done and consents in writing. What happens is this: Suppose the plaintiff
sues two defendants, figures they are equally liable for total damages of about
$30,000.00, .and settles with one for $14,000.00. When the case is tried, the
remaining defendant argues, naturally, that the absent defendant is primarily
at fault. If the jury decides that damages are $35,000.00 with the plaintiff
twenty percent negligent, the settling defendant fifty percent negligent, the
remaining defendant thirty percent negligent, the plaintiff in Wisconsin receives
only an additional $10,500.00. By contrast, under joint and several liability if
the $14,000.00 previously received were the only setoff allowed, the plaintiff
would receive another $14,000.00 ($35,000.00 less twenty percent less $14,000.00).
The Wisconsin practice has the potential for penalizing the plaintiff rather
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job safety to those parties who are in a position to improve
safety conditions. 77 If the fault of those immune to suit is permitted to be compared so as to diminish judgments, the purpose
of the Structural Work Act is thwarted. In such instance, the
burden would fall upon the injured worker-the party least likely
to be economically positioned to bargain for conditions to enhance
job safety.
MULTIPLE TORTFEASORS AND DIVISIBLE INJURIES:
THE DEMISE OF EQUITABLE APPORTIONMENT
Under Illinois tort law, an injured plaintiff may sue one of
several joint tortfeasors and recover the entire verdict from one
defendant.78 Prior to Skinner, such defendant could shift his
entire liability to the other tortfeasors through indemnity only if
he could prove a pre-tort relationship and a qualitative distinction between his acts and theirs.7 9 Where two tortfeasors were
not acting jointly but the second tortfeasor aggravated the initial
injury, the plaintiff could still sue the original tortfeasor alone
and recover the entire judgment from him. 0 Indemnity was not
available because the parties did not have the necessary pre-tort
relationship. In Gertz v. Campbell,8 ' however, the Illinois Supreme Court allowed a claim for equitable apportionment where
the injury to the plaintiff was divisible between the two defendants. This decision was the forerunner to the supreme court's
adoption of contribution in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice.

grievously for misestimating the settlement mechanics of his case. No similar
penalty can be imposed on a defendant under the Illinois Contribution Act. Not
surprisingly, plaintiffs are less eager to settle with less than all defendants
where several liability (sometimes also called "proportionate liability") prevails.
Amicus Curiae Brief at 60-61, Coney v. J.L.G. Indus., Inc., No. 56306, slip op. (Ill. Sup. Ct.
May 18, 1983).
77. See supra notes 38-39, 43-44 and accompanying text.
78. See Buehler v. Whalen, 70 Ill. 2d 51, 64, 374 N.E.2d 460, 466 (1977); Carver v.

Grossman, 55 Ill. 2d 507, 511, 305 N.E.2d 161, 163 (1973); Storen v. City of Chicago, 373
Ill. 530, 533, 27 N.E.2d 53, 55 (1940).
79. See Muhlbauer v. Kruzel, 39 Ill. 2d 226, 234 N.E.2d 790 (1968); Sargent v. Interstate Bakeries, Inc., 86 Ill. App. 2d 187, 229 N.E.2d 769 (1st Dist. 1967); Reynolds v. Illinois Bell Tel. Co., 51111. App. 2d 334, 201 N.E.2d 322 (1st Dist. 1964); Bua, supranote 54.
80. See Gertz v. Campbell, 55 111. 2d 84, 88, 302 N.E.2d 40, 43 (1973); Chicago City Ry.
v. Saxby, 213 Ill. 274, 281, 72 N.E. 755, 758 (1904); Stephenson v. Air Prod. & Chem., Inc.,
114 Ill. App. 2d 124, 133, 252 N.E.2d 366, 370 (5th Dist. 1969); W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF
THE LAW OF TORTS § 61 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 460 (1977).
81. 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40(1973).
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In Gertz, a pedestrian brought a negligence action against a
motorist who struck and injured him. Campbell, the motorist,
filed a third-party complaint alleging malpractice against the
physician, Dr. Snyder, who treated the pedestrian.8 2 The trial
court's dismissal of the third-party complaint was reversed by
the appellate court, which held that Campbell stated a claim for
"equitable apportionment. ' 8 3 The supreme court affirmed the
appellate court decision, recognizing that the motorist, as the
original tortfeasor, was liable under controlling case law for the
aggravation of injuries suffered by the victim as a result of Dr.
Snyder's negligence.8 4 The court noted that the defendant's
third-party claim was not a traditional indemnity claim in that it
did not attempt to shift the entire liability to the physician. Nor
was it a claim for contribution, which was prohibited, because
the motorist and physician were not joint tortfeasors. 85 Stating
that the relief the defendant sought was not "repugnant to the
notion of indemnity,"8 6 the court held that he had a right to
indemnification from Dr. Snyder for the plaintiffs damages
87
attributable to the physician's malpractice.
The query now is whether the Contribution Act affects the
doctrine of equitable apportionment. The typical contribution
case arises where one indivisible injury is caused by two or more
tortfeasors. Damages are apportioned in accordance with the
relative degree of fault attributable to each individual tortfeasor.88 Equitable apportionment cases require a divisible injury

82. Id. at 85, 302 N.E.2d at 41. The plaintiffs leg was broken as a result of the car
accident. Necessary surgery was postponed, the condition of the leg deteriorated and
ultimately the leg was amputated.
83. 4 Ill. App. 3d 806, 282 N.E.2d 28 (2d Dist. 1972).
84. The supreme court cited Chicago City Ry. v. Saxby, 213 Ill. 274, 72 N.E. 755 (1904),
noting that a person injured through another's negligence can recover not only for the
original injury, but for any aggravation of the injury caused by a physician's malpractice, assuming there was no lack of ordinary care by the injured party in selecting the
physician. 55 Ill. 2d at 88, 302 N.E.2d at 43.
85. 55 Ill. 2d at 88-89, 302 N.E.2d at 43.
86. Id. at 90, 302 N.E.2d at 44.
87. Id. at 92, 302 N.E.2d at 45.
In Alberstett v. Country Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 407, 398 N.E.2d 611 (2d Dist.
1979), Gertz was extended to permit prior allegedly malpracticing doctors to recover from
subsequent allegedly malpracticing doctors a pro rata share of the cost of the release
which the first doctors paid to the injured party. The court asserted: "It may be true, as
appellees argue, that a doctor has the continuing duty to care for the patient. But that
duty cannot be extended to make him liable for the negligence of doctors sought out for
treatment by the plaintiffs independently." Id. at 411, 398 N.E.2d at 614.
88. For example, in Skinner the plaintiff was injured while working with an allegedly
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caused by two or more tortfeasors, with damages determined in
relation to the extent of the injury caused by each tortfeasor8 9
In Van Jacobs v. Parikh,90 the Illinois Appellate Court held that
a claim for equitable apportionment was actually a claim for
contribution, 91 since an original tortfeasor may seek contribution for damages attributable to an aggravating injury caused
by successive tortfeasors. Unlike the common law contribution
requirement that tortfeasors be jointly and severally liable, the
Contribution Act requires only that the tortfeasors be "subject to
liability" for the same injury. 92 Thus, the Van Jacobs court concluded that the original tortfeasor who technically did not "cause"
the aggravating injury may obtain contribution from the second
tortfeasor who did cause the injury, because both were subject to
93
liability for that injury.
By recognizing the availability of equitable apportionment, the
Gertz decision significantly affected the pre-Skinner plaintiff in
terms of litigation strategy. With the adoption of contribution,
however, it is difficult to imagine a set of facts that would result
in a claim for equitable apportionment but not contribution. In
effect, the Act has supplanted the need for equitable apportionment. Nevertheless, the concerns of the plaintiff in equitable
apportionment cases are still prevalent under contribution. The
effects of subsequent third-party suits on the plaintiffs case will
vary depending on the original cause of action filed and the facts
supporting the cause of action. A comparison of a medical malpractice case involving an indivisible injury and one involving a
divisible injury will serve to illustrate these effects.
Assume a case where a plaintiff is injured following surgery
involving a medical product which fails. The plaintiff may sue
either the manufacturer of the product, the physician performing

malfunctioning injection molding machine. The manufacturer of the machine charged

the employer of the plaintiff with negligence and claimed its assumption of the risk and
misuse of the machine caused the plaintiff's injuries.
89. See Gertz v. Campbell, 55 Ill. 2d 84, 302 N.E.2d 40 (1973). See also Alberstett v.
Country Mut. Ins. Co., 79 Ill. App. 3d 407,398 N.E.2d 611 (2d Dist. 1979).
90. 97 Ill. App. 3d 610, 422 N.E.2d 979 (1st Dist. 1981).
91. Id. at 614, 422 N.E.2d at 982. In Van Jacobs, the plaintiffs husband was killed
when defendant Parikh's car ran into the decedent's motorcycle. At the time of the collision, the decedent was wearing a helmet manufactured by defendant Roper. Roper filed a
third-party complaint against the driver after the driver had settled with the plaintiff.
92. Id.
93. Id. The court also noted that the manufacturer's complaint failed to state a claim
for equitable apportionment since the injury was indivisible.
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the surgery, or both parties for this indivisible injury. If the
plaintiff sues only the manufacturer, the latter will likely bring a
third-party action against the physician. Under these circumstances, the physician will benefit by aligning himself with the
plaintiff and assisting him in proving that failure of the product
was the sole proximate cause of the plaintiffs injuries. Likewise,
if only the physician is sued, a third-party action will probably
be brought against the manufacturer, which will then seek to
prove that the physician's negligence and not the product caused
plaintiffs injuries. Even where neither party intentionally aligns
itself with the plaintiff, the defendants' attempts to shift the
burden of liability to each other will assist the plaintiff in proving the elements of his case.
In the case where the plaintiff sustains an injury which is
later aggravated by a treating physician, the plaintiff again may
sue either the original tortfeasor, the physician, or both parties.94
Yet, because the parties were not acting jointly, neither party is
in a position to align itself with the plaintiff and assist him in
proving his case. Furthermore, the plaintiff is faced with the
complications involved in litigation with multiple parties. 95 Unlike the case of an indivisible injury, the plaintiff in a divisible
injury case is not necessarily in a stronger position because of
the addition of extra parties.
From the perspective of third parties seeking to shift liability,
the adoption of contribution has eliminated the need for equitable apportionment. Nevertheless, the factual circumstances which
distinguish a divisible injury from an indivisible injury remain a
major factor affecting the alignment of the parties and ultimately the plaintiffs entire litigation strategy. Plaintiffs' attorneys must therefore keep these distinctions in mind when preparing for trial, notwithstanding the unlikelihood of confronting
a claim for equitable apportionment.
94. Unlike joint tortfeasors, under Illinois tort law, a subsequent tortfeasor is liable
only for the aggravation of the plaintiffs injury and has no liability for the original
injury. Therefore, a contribution suit by the physician against the original tortfeasor is
unnecessary since the plaintiff will never recover the damages attributable to the original
tortfeasor from the physician. See F. HARPER, LAW OF TORTS § 302 (1933).
95. These complications include the added complexity of issues and the possibility of
confusing the jury. See Gosnell, Presentingthe Defendant's Case, in ILLINOIS CIVIL TRIAL
PRACnIcE 11-13 (1979). As one commentator has noted, the plaintiff is also helped by the
addition of third parties through the increased chance of settlement and the reduction of
the practical burden of persuasion. Record, Introduction to Third Party Practice,in THiRD
PARTY PRACTICE 1-6 (1981).
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ABROGATION OF TRADITIONAL TORT IMMUNITIES AND THE
A'ITORNEY'S CONFLICT OF INTEREST
96
With the adoption of contribution in Skinner v. Reed-Prentice,

a defendant could file a third-party claim against the plaintiffs
employer, a party the plaintiff was prohibited from suing directly. 97 Following Skinner, defendants began to attack other
traditional and statutory immunity bars successfully. The fall of
these traditional immunities has substantial repercussions for
plaintiffs and their attorneys.
In 1981, the Illinois Appellate Court held that the Interspousal
Tort Immunity Statute98 would not preclude a third-party action
against the plaintiffs husband. In Wirth v. City of Highland
Park,99 the plaintiff was injured when she fell down the stairway of a building owned by the defendant. The plaintiff's husband, as manager of the building, was named in a third-party
complaint. The court cited several factors in upholding the claim
against the plaintiff's husband. First, the court noted that many
jurisdictions had already abrogated the interspousal immunity
doctrine in whole or in part. 10 0 In addition, the recent trend in
Illinois had been to curtail common law immunities in favor of
contribution '0 1 and the Illinois Contribution Act'0 2 did not specifically retain these immunities. 10 3 Finally, the court relied on
the legislative history of the Act which indicated the drafters'
4
intent to preclude immunities as a bar to contribution. 10

96. 70 Ill. 2d 1, 374 N.E.2d 437 (1977), modified, 70 Ill. 2d 16, cert. denied sub nom.
Hinckley Plastic, Inc. v. Reed-Prentice Div. Package Mach. Co., 436 U.S. 946 (1978).
97. The plaintiff was precluded from suing her employer by the exclusivity provision
in the Illinois Workers' Compensation Act, ILL REV. SWAT. ch 48, 138.5 (1981).
98. ILL REV. SAT. ch. 40, 1001 (1981). The statute provides:
A married woman may, in all cases, sue and be sued without joining her husband with her, to the same extent as if she were unmarried; provided, that
neither husband nor wife may sue the other for tort to the person committed
during coverture. An attachment or judgment in such action may be enforced
by or against her as if she were a single woman.
99. 102 Ill. App. 3d 1074, 430 N.E.2d 236 (2d Dist. 1981).
100. Id. at 1078-80, 430 N.E.2d at 240-41.
101. Id. at 1080, 430 N.E.2d at 241. The court cited Skinner and Alvis v. Ribar, 85 Mll.
2d 1, 421 N.E.2d 886 (1981), to support its position. See also Comment, Comparative Contribution: The Legislative Enactment of the Skinner Doctrine,14 J. MAR. L REV. 173, 194
(1980) (author advocates the Contribution Act eliminates traditional common law
immunities).
102. ILL REv. SAT. ch 70,
301-305 (1981).
103. 102 111. App. 3d at 1081, 430 N.E.2d at 242.
104. Id.
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These same factors, among others, were discussed in Larson v.
Buschkamp.'0 5 In Larson, an action was brought on behalf of
minor children against the driver and owner of the automobile
that collided with the vehicle in which the children were passengers. 106 The children's vehicle was driven by their father at the
time of the accident. The father was named by the plaintiff as a
defendant and by the other defendants as a third-party defendant. The trial court granted the father's motion to dismiss both
the original claim and the third-party claim on the basis of
parent-child immunity. 107 The appellate court reversed, holding
that the doctrine of parent-child immunity poses not a substantive bar to actions between a parent and child, but merely a procedural bar to enforcement. The parent was, therefore, "subject
to liability" as required for a contribution action. 10 8
The preceding decisions will affect the plaintiffs strategy in
tort litigation where a marital or parent-child relationship exists
between the parties involved in the tort. 0 9 The factual situation
of a two car accident with an injured passenger illustrates the
possible effects. Where the passenger is related to one of the
drivers involved, he or she will often opt not to sue or will be
prohibited from suing the driver, 110 yet the driver may be liable
for contribution if any fault on his behalf is established. Of overriding concern to an attorney in such a case is the potential conflict of interest problem which may arise should he represent
both the passenger and the driver. 1 ' For example, if the plaintiffs attorney proves the passenger's case against the defendant,

105. 105 Ill. App. 3d 965, 435 N.E.2d 221 (2d Dist. 1982).
106. Id. at 966, 435 N.E.2d at 222.
107. Id. at 967, 435 N.E.2d at 223.
108. Id. at 970, 435 N.E.2d at 225. The action against the driver was brought by the
mother of the minor children. The interlocutory appeal only sought review of the dismissal of the counterclaim for contribution against the father and not the dismissal of the
original complaint against him.
109. See also Doyle v. Rhodes, 109 Ill. App. 3d 590, 440 N.E.2d 895 (1982), case under
advisement, No. 57540 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May Term 1983) (workers' compensation immunity
will not bar a third-party claim against plaintiffs employer); Stephens v. McBride, 105
Ill. App. 880, 435 N.E.2d 162 (1982), case under advisement, No. 56665 (Ill. Sup. Ct. May
Term 1983) (Governmental Tort Immunity Act will not bar a third-party claim against
government entity).
110. See supranotes 97-109.

111.

See

MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

EC 5-14 to 5-17, DR 5-105

(1979). Ethical Consideration 5-14 provides:
Maintaining the independence of professional judgment required of a lawyer
precludes his acceptance or continuation of employment that will adversely
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he may indirectly create liability for the driver of the passenger's
vehicle as a result of a third-party contribution action by the
original defendant against the driver. Moreover, if the driver of
the passenger's vehicle is uninsured, the passenger's attorney
may be faced with representing the driver both as a plaintiff and
a defendant.
In addition, the existence of the doctrine of joint and several
liability creates potential conflict of interest problems.11 2 Consider the situation where an attorney represents both the injured
passenger and the driver of an automobile, but only brings an
action for the passenger against the second driver. Under joint
and several liability, the defendant found guilty of any negligence proximately causing the plaintiffs injuries is liable for the
entire amount of damages incurred by the plaintiff. Absent joint
and several liability, however, the defendant in the above example would not be liable for the entire amount of damages unless
his negligence was the sole proximate cause of the occurrence.
Rather, he would incur liability only for the amount of damages
attributed to his conduct. As a result, if the driver of the passenger's vehicle was partially responsible for the accident, the
passenger would be required to name the driver as a defendant
in order to recover the remainder of his damages. In such
instance, it is incumbent upon the plaintiffs attorney to file suit
against both the driver of the passenger's automobile and the
driver of the second automobile if it appears that both drivers
were negligent. The obvious conflict of interest problem would
preclude the attorney's representing both the passenger and the
driver.
The rejection of traditional immunity bars in favor of thirdparty contribution actions creates a variety of potential conflicts
of interest. Plaintiffs' attorneys must recognize these conflicts at
the outset in order to represent their clients properly. Clients
should be fully apprised of the ethical necessity of separate
counsel for other family members involved in the case and the
legal necessity of a lawsuit against those family members.

affect his judgment on behalf of or dilute his loyalty to a client. This problem
arises whenever a lawyer is asked to represent two or more clients who may
have differing interests, whether such interests be conflicting, inconsistent,
diverse, or otherwise discordant.
112. See supra notes 65-75.
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A Plaintiff's Perspective
CONCLUSION

Although third-party practice is commonly recognized as the
tool of the defendant, its use greatly affects the original plaintiff
in several ways. Evidence of its effects readily appears in cases
involving employment related injuries. Although the Workers'
Compensation Act protects an employer from a direct suit by the
employee, the employer can be impleaded by the employee's
defendant. Defendants in Structural Work Act suits, for instance,
may implead employers who were "in charge of" the work and
11 3
were in a position to alleviate dangerous working conditions.
After Skinner, an employer is also amenable to a third-party suit4
for contribution by a manufacturer in a products liability action.1
As a result of this potential third-party exposure, increased
incentive exists for an employer to create a safer working environment. In addition, the employer may be more willing to help
the plaintiff prove his case against the defendants in products
liability or Structural Work Act suits.
Similarly, in other areas of tort litigation, such as medical
malpractice arising from a physician's use of a defective product,
the plaintiff and third-party defendant may find their interests
closely aligned. Any assistance each may offer the other in proving the defendant's negligence will work to the benefit of both.
Finally, with the adoption of contribution, a plaintiff may find
that a relative has been named a third-party defendant in a case
that would have been barred under traditional immunity principles. Since these principles no longer apply to prevent the joinder
of a relative in the plaintiffs suit, conflict of interest problems
will arise if the plaintiffs attorney attempts to represent both
parties. Such problems are readily apparent in automobile accident cases where the injured passenger and his driver are related.
A plaintiff's attorney must be cognizant of the law relating to
third-party practice and fully understand its effect on the plaintiffs case. This awareness will prove especially useful in Illinois
as a result of the Contribution Act and pertinent case law. Plaintiffs' practitioners will find it in the best interest of their clients
to pursue an active role with regard to third-party actions, working jointly with defendants during negotiation and formulation
of trial strategy.
113.
114.

See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 51-52 and accompanying text.

